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gan when Yuri Gagarin first orbited the Earth in 1961, recent
technological developments coupled with the dedication of wellfunded entrepreneurs have taken spaceflight from the province
of governmental action and delivered it into the private sector.'
Multiple space tourism companies are planning to send private
passengers on suborbital and orbital flights within the coming
years, private spaceports are being built around the world, and
at least one company is well on its way to placing private space
stations into orbit to serve as manufacturing facilities, laboratories, or even space hotels.2 Moreover, changes to the U.S. Space
Policy recently proposed by the Obama Administration would
accelerate the development of the human spaceflight industry.3
These proposals call for the abolition of NASA's Constellation
program that entailed the development of the next generation
of government space vehicles-and instead recommend that the
government set aside six billion dollars to purchase crew and
cargo delivery services from private companies to meet government requirements for ferrying cargo and crew to the International Space Station and placing satellites into orbit.4 This
increased demand for services will enable private space companies to develop the next generation of space vehicles that will
likely include a line of reusable launch vehicles that should improve greatly upon the current space shuttle technology.5
Despite this bright outlook for commercial human spaceflight, the industry faces several significant challenges before it
achieves sustainability. Although these challenges are largely
technological and financial, one of the more serious obstacles to
the industry's success is regulatory in nature, namely, the burdensome export control regulations under U.S. law. Export
I See infta Part II.

See infra Part II.
Kenneth Chang, Obama Calls for End to NASA's Moon Program, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/science/02nasa.html.
4 Id. Even before this new policy emerged, a private company, Elon Musk's
SpaceX, already received a NASA contract to deliver cargo to the International
Space Station. Press Release, NASA, NASA Awards Launch Services Contract to
SpaceX (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/apr/HQCO
8023 KSClaunch_ services.html; see also Dana Hedgpeth, Smaller Companies Win
NASA's Space Race, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at Dl.
5 The Obama Administration's proposal has met with resistance both in the
Senate and, in particular, in the House of Representatives, thus making it unclear
to what extent the President's policy will be implemented. Kenneth Chang, Senate Committee's NASA Plan Cuts Moon Program,N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A16;
Kenneth Chang, House Panel's NASA Spending Bill Cuts Back Obama Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A12.
2
3
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controls on space technology are notoriously strict in the United
States, where all technology related to spacecraft is subject to
the same complicated and restrictive export controls that govern the export of munitions under the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR).6 In fact, the United States is the only
country in the world that treats commercial space technology
like munitions, rather than as dual-use technology that has a primarily commercial application.' The application of ITAR to
space technology has harmed the ability of U.S. space companies to compete on the world market, as is perhaps best illustrated by the practice of certain European satellite
manufacturers to market "ITAR-free" satellites-that is, satellites
that do not incorporate any components manufactured in the
United States and are therefore free of the regulatory complexities and compliance costs that flow from ITAR.8 As a result, European satellite sales have increased sharply, cutting deeply into
6 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17 (2009).
There is no shortage of commentators who criticize the complexity of ITAR. See,
e.g., R. Aylan Broadbent, U.S. Export Controls on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: Is
the High Tech Industry Suffering?, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE LAw L.J. 49 (1999);
Jason A. Crook, National Insecurity: ITAR and the Technological Impairment of U.S.
National Space Policy, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 505 (2009); Trevor Hiestand, Swords into
Plowshares:Considerationsfor 2 1st Century Export Controls in the United States, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 679, 690-91 (1995); Cecil Hunt, U.S. Export Controls, in COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 19 (2000) (describing the U.S. system of export controls
as a "frightful labyrinth"); Jere W. Morehead & David A. Dismuke, Export Control
Policies and National Security: Protecting U.S. Interests in the New Millenium, 34 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 173, 180 (1999); Ronald J. Sievert, Urgent Message to Congress-Nuclear
Triggers to Libya, Missile Guidance to China, Air Defense to Iraq, Arms Supplier to the
World: Has the Time Finally Arrived to Overhaul the U.S. Export ControlRegime?-The
Casefor Immediate Reform of Our Outdated, Ineffective, and Self-DefeatingExport Control
System, 37 TEX. INT'L LJ. 89, 92 (2002). Even the Department of Defense has now
openly criticized the complexity of the current export control regime. DEP'T OF
DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 83 (2010), http://www.defense.gov/
QDR/images/QDR as_of_12FeblO_1000.pdf (explaining that "our overly complicated system results in significant interagency delays that hinder U.S. industrial
competitiveness and cooperation with allies").
7 For a description of the European approach to export controls with respect
to space technology, see generally Laurent Crapart, The Implementation of Export
Controls in the European Community-MakingBalance Between Security and Commercial
Considerations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SixTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 246 (2004); Antonella Bini, Export Control of Space Items: Preserving
Europe's Advantage, 23 SPACE POLIcY 70 (2007); Frans von der Dunk, A European
"Equivalent"to the United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies, 7 ASTROPOLITICS 101 (2009).

8 See Center for Strategic and International Studies, Briefing of the Working

Group on the Health of the U.S. Space IndustrialBase and the Impact of Export Controls,
at 10, Executive Summary, Findings 10 & 11 (Feb. 2008); Bini, supranote 7, at 70
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the market share of U.S. manufacturers.9 U.S.-based space tourism companies and other private spaceflight companies are sure
to suffer the same ill effects of ITAR unless relief is provided
either by legal reform or through the granting of special discretionary relief by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(DDTC), which is the administrative agency that oversees the
application and enforcement of ITAR.' 0
On August 13, 2009, the Obama Administration announced
that the President had established a task force to undertake a
broad-based review of U.S. export controls, which will include a
review of those controls applicable to satellites and other space
technology." In order to expedite the process of reform, President Obama issued Presidential Study Directive 8 on December
21, 2009, which required that recommendations for reform
based on the findings of the review process be submitted to him
by January 21, 2010.12 However, this deadline passed without
the public release of any such recommendations, and, given the
complexity of the regulations and the political sensitivity of the
topic of export controls, significant changes are not expected to
be implemented anytime soon.'" In the meantime, the only
(discussing Alcatel's development of ITAR-free satellites); Eligar Sadeh, Export
Controls of Space Technologies, 6 ASTROPOLITICS 105, 109 (2008).
9 See Bini, supranote 7, at 70 (stating that the market share of U.S. manufacturers shrank from 64% in 1998 to 36% in 2002, while Alcatel's market share of the
global satellite business doubled between 1998 and 2004); Philip L. Spector, Satellite Export Controls: Five Years and Counting, 18 AIR & SPACE LAw. 12, 13 (2003)
(stating that from 2002 to 2003, foreign customers purchased twice as many satellites from foreign manufacturers than from U.S. manufacturers); Ryan Zelnio,
The Effects ofExport Control on the Space Industry, SPACE REv. (Jan. 16, 2006), http://
www.thespacereview.com/article/533/1 (explaining that prior to the shift of jurisdiction over satellite exports to the Department of State in 1999, U.S. satellite
manufacturers enjoyed, on average, an 83% market share of the global satellite
sales, but that this market share declined to 50% by 2006).
10 Major Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., State Supervision of Space Activity, 63 A.F. L. REv.
75, 92 n.96 (2009).
11White House, Statement of the Press Secretary, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Statement-of-the-Press-Secretary; see also Amy
Klamper, Obama Memo Puts Export Reform on Front Burner, SPACE NEWS (Jan. 15,
2010), http://www.spacenews.com/policy/100115-obama-memo-puts-export-reform-front-burner.html. Legislation was proposed in 2008 and 2009 that would
have required a review of the current export regime, but both bills stalled in the
Senate. Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008, H.R.
5916, 110th Cong.; Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011, H.R. 2410, 111th Cong. (2009).
12 Klamper, supra note 11.
13 Id. (explaining that "export control reform is a polarizing topic that pits
national security hawks against the American aerospace industry").
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hope for relief from the burdens of ITAR lies in the hands of
the DDTC. As described in this article, the DDTC has indicated
that it is willing to exercise its administrative discretion in a manner that will enable the nascent human spaceflight industry to
survive and even flourish in the global marketplace.1 4 This indication was given last year when the DDTC excepted Bigelow
Aerospace from the need to acquire a license and comply with
other requirements under ITAR before allowing foreign nationals aboard their expandable space stations.1 5 This ruling was
heralded as a breakthrough for the human spaceflight industry,
which now hopes to be granted the opportunity to operate
under a reduced regulatory burden, provided that the Bigelow
ruling is extended to other spaceflight companies, such as those
offering space tourism services.
This article tells the story of the DDTC's landmark Bigelow
ruling and makes the case for why a similar exception should be
granted to the space tourism companies that will soon be carrying their first customers into space. The following section sets
the stage for this discussion by providing a preliminary description of the regulations that govern the export of space technology and discussing how these regulations should be applied to
the space tourism industry. This article also examines the
DDTC's Bigelow ruling in the greater context of administrative
law and argues that the DDTC's actions provide a striking example of how an administrative agency can reshape the law
through administrative discretion when Congress is paralyzed by
party factionalism and political pressures.
II. ITAR AND HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
Whenever a company exports a spacecraft, a launch vehicle,
or a satellite, the export is subjected to the same controls that
are applied to the export of arms under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the AECA's implementing regulations,
ITAR.'" It was not always the case that space technology was
See infra Part III.
III.
16 In addition to implementing the policies of the U.S. government, the export
controls imposed by ITAR and the Export Administration Regulations (which, as
explained below, govern the export of dual-use technology) also implement the
principles of two international export control arrangements: (1) the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies, an international system designed to prevent certain rogue
countries, including Iran, North Korea, and Syria, from obtaining advanced mili14

15 See infra Part
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treated as munitions under ITAR. In the 1990s, under President
H.W. Bush, a movement began to transfer jurisdiction over the
export of commercial communications satellites from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce (DOC)."
This movement continued during the Clinton presidency and
by 1996 most of the licensing responsibilities for the export of
communications satellites had been transferred to the DOC.1 8
However, the DOC's jurisdiction over commercial satellites was
short-lived due to an incident in which Hughes Space and Communications Company and Loral Corporation divulged information related to two failed launches of Chinese rockets that were
carrying their payloads to an insurer without the necessary license from the DOC." In response to this incident, Congress
passed the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999, which transferred export licensing of "all satellites and related items" back to the jurisdiction of the Department of State, with the result that virtually all space technology
was once again subject to ITAR.20
While certain space technology should unquestionably be subject to strict export controls in order to prevent the proliferation
of dangerous weapons, such as technology related to ballistic
missiles, it is often argued that technologies that have a commercial as well as a potential military application, so-called "dual
use" items like communications satellites, should be controlled
under the less restrictive Export Administration Regulations,
which are administered by the DOC.2 1 The benefit of ajurisdictary technology; and (2) the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral arrangement to prevent the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying
weapons of mass destruction. See FImNis LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAw: A
TREATISE 459-61 (2009); Kenneth A. Dursht, From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action and the WassenaarArrangement, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 1079, 1106-10
(1998); Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration ofMilitary and Civilian Space Assets:
Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REv. 157, 189-91 (2004).
17 See Ram Jakhu & Joseph Wilson, The New United States Export Control Regime:
Its Impact on the Communications Satellite Industry, 20 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 157,
171-72 (2000); Zelnio, supra note 9.
18Jakhu & Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-72; Zelnio, supra note 9.
'9 Jakhu & Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-72; Zelnio, supra note 9.
20 Jakhu & Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-72; Zelnio, supra note 9; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105261, § 1513, 112 Stat. 1920 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778). The DOC
maintains jurisdiction over export matters related to the International Space Station (ISS) and hardware related to the ISS that has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the DOC through Commodity Jurisdiction Requests. Commerce
Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 774 Supp. 1 9A004 (2010).
21 See, e.g., Spector, supra note 9, at 13.
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tional transfer to the DOC is significant because the Export Administration Regulations are notably less burdensome than are
the controls under ITAR. Generally speaking, a company is less
likely to be required to seek a license from the DOC prior to the
export of a controlled item because licenses for the export of
controlled items are frequently not required for export to allied
countries, and moreover, various exceptions to the license requirement (such as for a low value shipment or for export to a
civilian end-user) are also available.2 2
Although the debate regarding the appropriate level of export controls over the last decade has centered on commercial
satellites, the DDTC now faces a new question, namely, how
ITAR should apply to new space technologies that have
emerged in recent years, in particular, the suborbital
spaceplanes that have been developed by space tourism companies and the private space stations that are under development
by Bigelow Aerospace. Virgin Galactic, the space tourism company launched by Sir Richard Branson, will be the first to begin
operations by flying tourists into suborbital space from Spaceport America, which is currently under construction in New
Mexico.2 3 (As a brief aside, despite being the brainchild of a
British citizen, Sir Richard Branson, Virgin Galactic is operating
in the United States through a Delaware corporation and is
therefore treated as a U.S. space tourism company.) The
spaceplanes being built by Virgin Galactic are reusable launch
vehicles that differ significantly from anything seen before. The
spaceplane, carrying a crew of two and six passengers, begins its
journey into space on the underbelly of an airplane that will lift
the spaceplane to an altitude of 52,000 feet at which point the
spaceplane will disengage, fire its rocket engine, and fly to an
altitude of approximately 65 miles above the Earth-just above
the generally accepted border of outer space, known as the
Krmin Line, which is located approximately 100 kilometers (or
62 miles) above the Earth. 24 After reaching its apogee, the
22 The Export Administration Regulations are similar to ITAR in one important respect, namely, that both the Export Administration Regulations and ITAR
treat the sharing of controlled technology with a foreign national as an export
(such sharing of information termed a "deemed export" in the Regulations). 15
C.F.R. § 734.2(b) (2) (ii).
23 JeffJones, Bill Would Prevent Space Tourist Lawsuits, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 10,
2009, at Al.
24 See Spaceships, VIRGIN GALACTIc, http://www.virgingalactic.com/overview/
spaceships (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). Regarding the KArmdn Line, see LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 16, at 167-68.
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spaceplane will begin a slow descent back into the atmosphere,
its speed broken by an innovative pivoting wing design that enables the plane to flutter through the upper layers of the atmosphere like a shuttlecock.
Once it reaches the heavier
atmosphere, the spaceplane glides back to Earth like an airplane.2 1 Other space tourism companies are also offering suborbital flights on spaceplanes, such as Rocketplane, an Oklahomabased company offering suborbital flights for $250,000, and
Xcor Aerospace, a California company offering suborbital
flights for the competitive price of $95,000.27 Starchaser, based
in the United Kingdom, plans to use both rocket-launched
space capsules as well as spaceplanes to send private passengers
into suborbital space.28 Other approaches to human spaceflight
are also being pursued by private enterprises. For example,
Blue Origin, a space tourism company founded by Amazon
founder Jeff Bezos, is developing a unique spacecraft that takes
off and lands vertically.29 Excalibur Almaz, a company based on
the Isle of Man, plans to put tourists into orbit in Soviet-made
Almaz space capsules.3 0 The company is also preparing to place
an Almaz space station into orbit to be used as a space hotel or
for other civilian purposes. 1 Similarly, Bigelow Aerospace's
planned private space stations (of which two prototypes have already been placed into orbit) utilize a new technology that allows for expandable modules to be placed in orbit, which are
then configured to the needs of the client (whether the purpose
is for manufacturing, research, or pleasure).3 The expandable
See Spaceships, supra note 24.
Id.
27 Jacqui Goddard, Up, Up and Ka-Ching! In a Time of Tight Budgets and Earthly
Priorities,the Space Business Is Getting a RejuvenatingJoltfrom Entrepreneurs Who Do the
Right Stuff on the Cheap, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/
2008/02/02/up-up-and-ka-ching.html; Reservations, ROCKETPLANE GLOBAL, INC.,
http://www.rocketplane.com/reservations.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); Reserve Your Ticket to the Edge of Space Today!, XCOR AEROSPACE, http://xcor.com/
contact/ticket.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
28 See Typical Space Tourism Mission, STARCHASER, http://www.starchaser.co.uk/
(last visited Sept.
index.php?view-tourism-missionoverview&mgroup=tourists
22, 2010).
29 Leonard David, Jeff Bezos' Secretive Rocket Program Picks Science Projects,
SPACE.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.space.com/news/091123-blue-originbezos-rocket.html.
- Stephen Baird, Space: The New Frontier!,67 TECH. TCHR. 13, 18 (2008).
25

26

3' Id.
32 Mike N. Gold, Lost In Space: A Practitioner'sFirst-HandPerspective on Reforming
the U.S.'s Obsolete, Arrogant, and CounterproductiveExport Control Regime for Space-
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modules can be packed into launch farings in a highly spaceand weight-efficient manner, thus dramatically reducing the
cost of placing space stations into orbit."
The following sections provide a detailed look at how the current export control regulations under U.S. law apply to space
technology and, in particular, how the regulations are likely to
apply to the new spaceplane technologies being developed by
the space tourism companies.
A.

THE

ARMs ExPoRT

CONTROL ACT

Our analysis of export controls applicable to space technology
begins with section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),
which addresses export controls over munitions.3 4 Section 38
opens with the following provision setting forth the President's
authority to control the export of munitions, primarily by
designating what technology should be included on the United
States Munitions List (USML):
In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the

United States, the President is authorized to control the import
and the export of defense articles and defense services and to
provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States
involved in the export and import of such articles and services.
The Presidentis authorized to designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this

section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export
of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List."
In addition to granting the President the authority to designate
controlled items, this provision states the overarching purpose
of these export controls-to promote world peace as well as the
security and foreign policy goals of the United States. The new
commercial space technologies of Virgin Galactic and Bigelow
Aerospace do not threaten peace and security and should thereRelated Systems and Technologies, 34J. SPACE L. 163, 168 n.17 (2008); see also Frank
Morring, Jr., High Mileage, 168 AVIATON WK. & SPACE TECH. 21 (2008).
3 Leonard Davis, PrivateSpace Stations Edge Closer to Reality, SPACE.COM (Jan. 20,
2010), http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/private-space-stations-bigelow-100120.html.
3 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
35 Id. § 2778(a) (1) (emphasis added). The opening provisions of ITAR restate
the President's authority to regulate the export of munitions and describe how
this authority has been delegated to the Department of State and, ultimately, to
the directorate of Defense Trade Controls under the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2009).
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fore enjoy relief from these controls under the AECA. This argument is strengthened in light of the factors set forth in the
AECA that are to be taken into account when determining
whether an export license should be granted." These factors
include whether the export of the article would contribute to (i)
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (ii) the spread
of terrorism, or (iii) the escalation of armed conflict.17 These
are important concerns to be sure, but if these are truly Congress's concerns, then there is no reason for the government to
subject purely commercial space technology to the AECA. As
discussed further below, the absence of such policy concerns in
the context of the technology being used by space tourism companies should facilitate the granting of exceptions by the DDTC
to reduce the regulatory burden on these companies.

B. ITAR CONTROLs

APPLICABLE TO

HuMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

At the core of the ITAR regime is the requirement that a license from the DDTC be acquired prior to the export of any
"defense article."3 8 A "defense article" is any item listed in section 121.1 of ITAR, better known as the United States Munitions
List-as well as any "technical data recorded or stored in any
physical form, models, mockups or other items that reveal technical data directly relating to items" on the USML." Section
120.3 of ITAR sets forth specific criteria for determining
whether a particular item that is not already listed on the USML
could be classified as a "defense article" and thus subjected to
ITAR control.4 0 Such a determination can be made if the item
in question (1) is designed for military use, does not have a primary civilian application, and exceeds the performance standards of equivalent civilian equipment, or (2) is designed for
military use and has "significant" military value (regardless of its
performance standards or whether it has a predominant civil
application).41
The threshold question for Bigelow Aerospace and the space
tourism companies is whether their equipment would be
deemed a "defense article." Under the section 120.3 criteria, it
appears that neither the Bigelow space stations nor Virgin Ga36

22 U.S.C.

§ 2778(a) (2).

3 Id.
3

22 C.F.R.

39 Id.
40 Id.
41

Id.

§ 127.1(a) (1).

§ 120.6.
§ 120.3.
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lactic's spaceplanes should qualify as "defense articles."4 2 They
are not designed for military use, they only have a civil application, and they cannot be said to exceed the performance standards of comparable civilian equipment since no comparable
civilian equipment exists-Bigelow's space stations and Virgin
Galactic's spaceplanes are alone in their class." Nevertheless,
despite the apparent failure of this technology to meet the criteria for being designated a "defense article" under section 120.3,
the space stations and spaceplanes still come under a specific
listing of controlled technology on the USML, and are therefore
subject to ITAR control. The relevant entry in the USML for the
human spaceflight industry is Category XV, which includes language that brings spacecraft and other space-related technology
within the scope of ITAR."
An analysis of Category XV reveals that the entry has four
main parts. First, all "spacecraft" and all "ground control stations" engaged in the telemetry, tracking, and control of spacecraft are "defense articles" and therefore come within the ambit
of ITAR.15 The term "spacecraft" is not defined in the regulation, which allows for a wide net to be cast by the DDTC when
applying the regulations. The only guidance given in the regulations is that the term "spacecraft" includes commercial satellites (which, in turn, includes Bigelow's orbiting space
stations).46 The space tourism companies should argue in their
commodity jurisdiction requests (seeking the removal of their
spaceplane technology from the USML)" that although their
spaceplanes are "spacecraft" in the colloquial sense, they are
purely commercial and therefore should not be subject to ITAR.
This interpretation is consistent with the treatment of aircraft,
which are subject to ITAR only if "designed, modified, or

See id.
See id.
- Id. § 121.1 Category XV.
4
Id. § 121.1 Category XV(a), (b). The exact language from subsection (a) is:
"[slpacecraft, including communications satellites, remote sensing satellites, scientific satellites, research satellites, navigation satellites, experimental and multimission satellites."
- Id. § 121.1 Category XV(a). That Bigelow's space stations are defense articles has been established by the DDTC's denial of Bigelow's request for a ruling
that its technology was not covered by, or should be removed from, the USML.
See infra Part III.
4
Regarding commodity jurisdiction requests, see infra Part III.
42

4
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equipped for military purposes"-thus, commercial aircraft are
not regulated by ITAR.4 8
In addition to being on the USML, spacecraft are also treated
as "significant military equipment" (SME), for which "special export controls" can be applied due to the military utility of the
technology (which designation is indicated by an asterisk prior
to the USML entry).49 Happily, this SME designation does not
apply to commercial satellites unless they are used for military
purposes, thus sparing Bigelow Aerospace from the threat of
these special controls.o
The second part of Category XV is made up of paragraphs (c)
and (d), which bring two special categories of space technology
within the scope of ITAR: global positioning systems (GPS) receivers and radiation-hardened circuitry.5 1 These categories of
controlled items would only apply to space tourism companies
to the extent that such equipment is used.
The third part of Category XV, set forth in paragraph (e),
significantly expands the scope of ITAR by applying it to "[a] ll
specifically designated or modified systems or subsystems, components, parts, accessories, attachments," and other equipment
associated with spacecraft, ground controls stations, and the special GPS and radiation-hardened technology.5 3
The fourth and final component of Category XV is found in
paragraph (f), which applies ITAR to all "technical data" and
"defense services" directly related to any of the items mentioned
in Category XV or any "launch support activities," such as providing launch parameters to a launch provider.54
The definition of "defense service" includes, among other
things, providing a foreign person with "technical data" relating
to a defense article. The sharing of such data will constitute a
"defense service" whether the data is divulged in the United
- 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category VIII(a).
49 Id. §§ 120.7, 121.1 Category XV(a), Note.
50 Id. § 121.1 Category XV(a), Note.
51 Id. § 121.1 Category XV(c), (d).
52 See id.
53 Id. § 121.1 Category XV(e). This section excludes from ITAR's control nine
specific types of components, such as space-qualified data recorders and certain
types of photovoltaic arrays, unless they are designed for military use. Id.
54 Id. § 121.1 Category XV(f).
55 Id. § 120.9(2). "Defense services" also include: (1) "[t]he furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons" in the design, manufacture, modification, use, testing, repair, or even the destruction of a defense article; and (2)
the provision of military training. Id. § 120.9(a) (1), (3).
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States or abroad.5 1 "Technical data," in turn, is broadly defined
in section 120.10 to include the following four concepts:
(1) Information [in whatever format] . . . which is required for

the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly,
operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles....
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and defense services;
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; and
(4) Software . . . directly related to defense articles.

The scope of controlled "technical data" related to launch support activities is particularly broad by explicitly including "technical data provided to the launch provider on form, fit,
function, mass, electrical, mechanical, dynamic, environmental,
telemetry, safety, facility, launch pad access, and launch parameters, as well as interfaces for mating and parameters for
launch."5 8 Of particular concern to the space tourism industry
is the inclusion of safety information in this expanded definition
of technical data.5 9 For example, a space tourism company
could potentially be found to be providing a "defense service"
merely by training a foreign customer in safety procedures, such
as the operation of safety hatches on the vessel. This concern
will be addressed, and hopefully allayed, in the following section
where the safety training requirements of the U.S. human
spaceflight regulations are discussed.o As a final comment, it
comes as some measure of relief that "basic marketing information" is explicitly excluded from the definitions of both "technical data" and "defense article."" And so space tourism
companies can at least rest assured that they need not seek a
license before launching websites that market their suborbital
adventures.
C.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN PASSENGERS ARE
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Even assuming that suborbital spaceplanes come within the

definition of "spacecraft" under Category XV of the USML and
are therefore defense articles, a license from the DDTC is still
56
-7
58

59
60
61

Id. § 120.9(a) (2).
Id. § 120.10.
Id. § 121.1 Category XV(f).
See id.
See infra Part II.C.
22 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(a) (5), 120.6.
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not required unless the spaceplanes are exported. Thus if, for
example, Virgin Galactic's spaceplanes are flown by its U.S. subsidiary from a U.S. spaceport, such as Spaceport America in New
Mexico, and land there as well, no exportation would seem to
take place, thus apparently avoiding the burdens of ITAR.6 2
This is, however, not the case. The concept of an "export" is
broadly defined under ITAR to include not only the physical
movement of defense articles across the borders of the United
States, but also the following actions:
* "Transferring registration, control or ownership to a foreign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered by
the U.S. Munitions List. . .";
* "Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring in the United States any defense article to an embassy, any agency or subdivision of a foreign government
* "Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign person . . ."; and

* "Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a foreign person .... "6
This broad concept of what constitutes an export under ITAR
thus includes not only selling controlled items into foreign
countries, but embraces the disclosure of information related to
controlled technology to a "foreign person,"64 regardless of how
such disclosure is made."
Once again, of particular concern to Bigelow Aerospace, Virgin Galactic, and the other human spaceflight companies is
whether in the course of their discussions with, and training of,
See id. § 120.17(a), (b).
Id. § 120.17.
6 The definition of "foreign person" includes: (1) "any natural person who is
not a lawful permanent resident" of the United States (or a lawful refugee or
asylee); (2) any corporation (or other organization) "that is not incorporated or
organized to do business in the United States"; and (3) "international organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments
62
6-

...

."

Id.

§

120.16.

Space technology is accorded special treatment in two respects in the definition of "export." First, the mere transfer of registration, control, or ownership of
satellites (even if no physical transfer takes place-presumably due to the fact
that the satellite is in orbit) constitutes an export. Id. § 120.17(a) (2). That a
license is needed before such transfers take place is reiterated in section 123.8.
Id. § 123.8(a). Exportation also takes place if a satellite located in the United
States is registered in a foreign country. Id. § 123.8(b). Second, the definition
makes clear that exportation is not deemed to have taken place merely because a
launch vehicle or payload is launched into space. Id. § 120.17(a) (6).
65
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their foreign customers they will be deemed to have disclosed
"technical data" relating to their spacecraft-which might, in
turn, be treated as the export of a defense article or the performance of a "defense service."" As explained above, "technical data" includes information "required for the . . . operation"

of the spacecraft, which could be broadly interpreted to include
safety information provided to passengers regarding the operation of hatches and other onboard safety equipment." If this
interpretation is adopted by the DDTC and such safety information is deemed to be controlled data, the disclosure of the information without DDTC approval would be prohibited regardless
of the form in which such data is displayed or stored (whether
in documents, models, or other items) and regardless of how
the data is communicated (whether by the sharing of documents, email, conversation, or by visual inspection).* Therefore, the mere presence of a foreign national on a Bigelow space
station or a spaceplane could be deemed to be an "export" of
technical data on the grounds that the passenger was provided
with the opportunity for a visual inspection of the design of the
equipment." As a result, a license from the DDTC would be
required before any foreign passengers could set foot on the
space station or spaceplane.o
On the other hand, it is not clear that information regarding
safety operations would necessary come within the definition of
"technical data."" Under a more reasonable interpretation of
the definition, information regarding safety operations would
not be treated as "technical data" since such safety operations
are not strictly "required" for the operation, i.e., the flight of the
spaceplane-just as the instructions given to airplane passengers
seated in the exit row of an airplane prior to take-off regarding
the opening of the emergency hatches does not provide them
with the information needed to fly the airplane.7 2 In fact, the
Air Force routinely puts on air shows that often provide the civilian attendees, whether U.S. citizens or foreign nationals, the
chance to view military aircraft up close and sometimes even sit
ss See id. §§ 120.9, 120.10.
67 Id. § 120.10(a) (1).
68 See id.
69

70
71
72

See
See
See
See

§§ 120.10 (a) (1), 125.2 (c).

id. § 120.17(a) (4).
id. § 125.2(c).
id. § 120.10.
id.
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in the cockpits."7 There is apparently no concern about the
transfer of technical data in these situations-just as there
should be no concern about the transfer of technical data to
space tourists. If the DDTC adopts this more reasonable interpretation, no license would be required prior to training the
passengers.
In a recent article, P.J. Blount examined the possibility that
the disclosure requirements under the FAA's Human Space
Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants
(Space Flight Regulations) may compel the disclosure of "technical data." 74 One of the provisions of the Space Flight Regulations that poses this risk is the requirement that the spaceflight
company train passengers how to respond to emergency situations on board, which could include information about how to
operate emergency hatches and other safety mechanisms on the
In addition, prior to the company receiving any
spacecraft.
compensation or entering into a flight agreement, the regulations require that the company disclose in writing to prospective
passengers information regarding "each known hazard and risk
that could result in a serious injury, death, disability, or total or
partial loss of physical and mental function .... "6 Moreover,
prior to flight, the company must provide "an opportunity to ask
questions orally to acquire a better understanding of the
hazards and risks of the mission" prior to the passenger providing written consent that indicates that the passenger understands the risks of the mission.
Although there is certainly a risk that the safety training and
other disclosures required under these provisions may amount
to the disclosure of "technical data," there is also a strong likelihood that ITAR would not be triggered, depending in part on
73 For example, the public air show at Scott Air Force Base in Shiloh, Illinois,
allows visitors to view planes up close and meet pilots and crew members. Scott
AFB Airshow Information, ScorrARSHOW.COM, http://scottairshow.com/info.html
(last visited July 17, 2010). A Florida airshow reportedly let a civilian sit in the
cockpit of a militaryjet. Mark Spivak, F-15 Demo Team, 33rd RCS Team for International Air Show, INSIDE AETC (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.aetc.af.mil/news/

story.asp?id=123140976.
74 P.J. Blount, Informed Consent v. ITAR: Regulatory Conflicts that Could Constrain
Commercial Human Space Flight, 66 AcTA

ASTRONAUTICA

1608, 1610 (2010).

Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71
Fed. Reg. 75,616-75,645 (Dec. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401,
415, 431, 435, 440, & 460).
75 14 C.F.R. § 460.51 (2010).
76 Id. § 460.45(a).
77 Id. § 460.45(f).
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the nature of the information disclosed. Blount argues that any
instruction provided regarding the operation of safety hatches
or other safety procedures would likely be treated as a disclosure
of technical data under ITAR, particularly in light of the language in Category XV of the USML, which states that "safety"
data related to "launch support activities" is deemed to be technical data "without exception."" However, this language should
not be interpreted as requiring information provided to a passenger in the course of safety training to be treated as technical
data "without exception" since the paragraph is limited to information disclosed in connection with "launch support activities."" This language contemplates information disclosed to
launch providers, not passengers, as is indicated by the example
provided in the text which states that an example of such technical data provided in connection with launch support activities
includes "technical data provided to the launch provider on the
form, fit, function, . . . safety, . . . [and] launch parameters, as

well as interfaces for mating and parameters for launch."" Despite these arguments against the treatment of safety training as
involving the disclosure of technical data, the risk remains that
the DDTC will come to a different conclusion.
As Blount points out in his article, a more difficult situation
could arise during the question and answer session required by
the Space Flight Regulations in order to allow the passengers to
become fully informed of all risks. 8 ' It is conceivable that passengers will inquire into more sensitive aspects of spacecraft
technology, such as the type of propellant used by the spacecraft
or engine mechanics-inquiries that would not be unreasonable
since this information is relevant to a thorough understanding
of the risks of spaceflight." However, if the company discloses
technical information of this type to a foreign customer, the
DDTC could find that the company has exported "technical
data" under ITAR."1
There is some irony in the fact that, on the one hand, ITAR
prohibits space tourism companies from disclosing safety information to foreign customers without first acquirng an export
license, while, on the other hand, the Space Flight Regulations
See Blount, supra note 74, at 1610; 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XV(f) (2010).
79 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XV(f).
78

80 See id.

Blount, supra note 74, at 1610-11.
See id.
88 Id. at 1610.
81
82
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may very well require the disclosure of such information. However, even if ironic, the regulations are not contradictory, and
compliance with both is necessary. The result is that a space
tourism company will have to acquire a license from the DDTC
before making any disclosures to a foreign passenger or prospective passenger that may rise to the level of "technical data"
under ITAR. An alternative approach would be for a company
to limit the type of information provided to its passengers and
rely on the advice of lawyers that the information provided does
not qualify as "technical data"-but this may be an unwise risk.
Moreover, the refusal to provide certain types of information
when requested by the passenger during the question and answer session may constitute a violation of the Space Flight Regulations and could lead to increased exposure to tort liability due
to a failure to obtain the fully informed consent of a passenger.
If a space tourism company is deemed to disclose technical
data to foreign customers, whether in discussions with the customer, during flight training, or by virtue of the mere presence
of the customer on the spaceplane, the company will need to
first register with the DDTC 4 (which registration must be renewed annually) and must then acquire a separate license from
the DDTC with respect to each customer prior to making any
disclosures. 5 The average processing time reported by the
DDTC for acting on license requests is approximately two to
three weeks."
If the only requirement imposed by ITAR were the license requirement, the burden on space tourism companies would not
be so severe. However, substantial additional obligations are in
fact imposed by the regulations. For example, space tourism
companies will be required to enter into a Technical Assistance
Agreement (which describes the parties to the transaction, the
information to be disclosed, and the nature of the project) with
each of its foreign customers prior to the disclosure of the controlled information. A Technical Assistance Agreement is required whenever a company discloses technical data to a foreign
person or engages in a "defense service."" Although the DDTC
84 22 C.F.R. § 122.1. In fact, a space tourism company would be required to
register with the DDTC as soon as it manufactured or acquired a spacecraft. Id.
85 Id. § 123.1.
86 License Processing Times, DiRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, http://
www.pmddtc.state.gov/metrics/index.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2010).
87 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.9, 124.1 et seq.; Gold, supra note 32, at 168 n.18.
- 22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a).
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strives to approve Technical Assistance Agreements within sixty
days of submission, it is not unusual for approval to take up to
three months after the agreements are submitted for approval."
The renegotiation of the conditions (or "provisos") placed on
the disclosure of the controlled information with the DDTC can
take an additional one to three months."o When U.S. space
tourism companies are competing for foreign customers, this
time-consuming approval process would be a dangerous hindrance that could destroy the ability of U.S. companies to compete with foreign operators. Imagine a customer that would like
to fly into space who has a choice between a U.S. company that
must seek approval of a Technical Assistance Agreement and a
foreign company that need not. The customer could potentially
face a delay of up to six months before the U.S. company could
even begin training. It would not be surprising if prospective
foreign customers instead decided to fly with a foreign space
tourism company to avoid such regulatory delays.
In order to avoid the complications of obtaining the approval
of a Technical Assistance Agreement, space tourism companies
could argue for an exemption under section 124.2(a), which
states that "[t]echnical assistance agreements are not required
for the provision of training in the basic operation .

.

. of de-

fense articles lawfully exported."' This exemption would appear to apply to the training of passengers in safety operation,
provided that a license permitting the disclosure was granted.
Of course, it would be preferable if the DDTC would make a
determination excepting the space tourism companies entirely
from ITAR with respect to their interactions with passengers.

D.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONs WHEN LAUNCHING FROM NONALLIED COUNTRIES

The burdens of ITAR could grow far greater when a U.S. company launches its satellites from the territory of a country that is
neither a member of NATO nor another "major non-NATO

ally" as defined in section 120.32 of ITAR." First, under section
9 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 32, at 168.
go Id. at 168-69.

91 22 C.F.R. § 124.2(a).

92 See id. §§ 120.32, 124.15(a) (1). NATO consists of twenty-eight current members including Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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124.15, a Technology Transfer Control Plan (TTCP) has to be
approved by the Department of Defense (DOD).9 A TTCP is a
written plan that describes the process for transferring the controlled information to foreign nationals and explains how the
information will be safeguarded from improper disclosure as
well how proper disclosures will be documented." The process
of developing and obtaining approval of a TTCP can take anywhere from one to three months." The entire process of obtaining a license, receiving approval of a Technical Assistance
Agreement, and obtaining approval of a TTCP has reportedly
taken as long as one year." If these regulatory burdens were
placed on U.S. space tourism companies, the delay would almost
certainly send prospective customers to foreign competitors that
were not subject to such delays.
In addition to the approval of a TTCP, when U.S. companies
conduct launches from non-allied territories the DOD has to be
notified in advance of any discussions with foreign nationals related to the launch-and the DOD then has the right to monitor these discussions.97 These monitoring activities are carried
out by the DOD's Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA)."8 The DTSA also has the right to send agents to the
launch site to monitor the launch as well as all related activity
and discussions with all monitoring expenses, as well as all travel
expenses, being borne by the owner of the space object."
These monitoring expenses can be significant. For example, after Bigelow Aerospace launched its first prototype space station
from Russia, it received a bill of $161,896 from the DTSA merely
for monitoring expenses, which came out to a rate of approximately $130 per hour (and which did not include the travel exMember Countries, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/natocountries.
htm (last visitedJuly 14, 2010). "Major non-NATO allies" include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. Id.
9 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a) (1).
94 Gold, supra note 32, at 169 n.19.
95 Id. at 169.
6

Id.

7 22 C.F.R. §§ 124.15(a)(1), 124.15(a) (2).
98 Space Directorate,DTSA, http://www.dtsa.mil/Directorates/SD.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
- 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a)(2). Section 124.15 also requires a license prior to the
participation of any U.S. party in a launch failure investigation or analysis-and
allows for DOD monitoring of any activities related to such investigation. Id.
§ 124.15(b).
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penses of the DTSA monitors).'o Although these special
controls are intended to apply to launches from non-allied
countries, the regulations state that these controls can be extended to launches from allied countries. 01
While these special controls are undeniably applicable to the
launch of Bigelow Aerospace's expandable space stations from a
Russian launch site, these controls should not necessarily apply
to the launch of suborbital space tourism flights. The language
of section 124.15 is reproduced here to show how it is limited to
the launch of "satellites" and therefore would not apply to the
launch of suborbital spacecraft:
The export of any satellite or related item (see § 121.1, Category
XV(a) and (e)) or any defense service controlled by this subchapter associated with the launch in, or by nationals of, a country that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or a major non-NATO ally of the United States always requires special exports controls ... 102
The reference to "any defense service controlled by this subchapter associated with [a] launch" presents the possibility that
the operations of a suborbital spaceflight company could come
within the scope of this provision when flying out of a non-allied
country. If the government adopts this interpretation, oral disclosures made to foreign space tourists could be deemed to be a
technical discussion that would be subject to monitoring. On
the other hand, it would be more reasonable to argue that this
provision was intended to apply only to the launch of satellites
(and defense services related to the launch of satellites) and not
to the taking off of a spaceplane.
E.

THE

DDTC's

DIsCRETION To GRANT EXCEPTIONS
FROM ITAR

Despite the strict controls on the export of space technology
described in the preceding sections, section 126.3 of ITAR
grants the DDTC broad discretion to grant exceptions from the
application of the regulations as follows: "In a case of exceptional or undue hardship, or when it is otherwise in the interest
of the United States Government, the Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls may make an exception to the provisions
100 Gold, supra note 32, at 181.
10 Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(c).
102

22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a) (emphasis added).
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of this subchapter."s0 3 This provision allows the DDTC to grant
an exception from ITAR (which composes the entire "subchapter" referred to in this section) under the circumstances described. As written, the discretion should be utilized primarily
in cases of "exceptional or undue hardship," but can also be applied under any circumstances in order to serve "the interest of
the United States Government."O4 No further guidance is given
regarding the type of governmental interest that would allow for
the suspension of ITAR, which means that it could potentially
be of any nature, whether based on national security, diplomatic
concerns, or commercial interests. The discretion provided by
section 126.3 was apparently instrumental in the Bigelow ruling
and also allows for the granting of similar exceptions to space
tourism companies, as explained in the following sections.
III.

THE BIGELOW AEROSPACE COMMODITY
JURISDICTION REQUEST

Some of the most eloquent and incisive comments regarding
the regulatory burdens imposed by ITAR are found in the writings of Michael Gold, the Corporate Counsel and Director of
the Washington office of Bigelow Aerospace.1 0 5 In various publications, Mr. Gold has described the surprisingly onerous (and
often nonsensical) demands that have been placed on Bigelow
Aerospace as the company launched its prototype space stations
into orbit from Russia.'0 6 In what has become one of the more
famous examples of the unreasonable requirements imposed
under ITAR, Mr. Gold has described how Bigelow Aerospace
was required (by a proviso in its Technical Assistance Agreement) to guard on a 24/7 basis a simple stand that was used to
hold the prototype space station prior to its being loaded into
the launch faring.' 0 7 Although the stand was from a functional
perspective not much different from a card table, it was deemed
1os

Id.

104

Id.

§ 126.3.

05 See Gold, supra note 32, at 164; Mike N. Gold, Thomas Jefferson, We Have a
Problem: The UnconstitutionalNature of the U.S.'s Aerospace Export Control Regime as
Supported by Bernstein v. U.S. Department of Justice, 57 CLuv. ST. L. REv. 629,
642-43 (2009); see also Interview with Michael Gold, REs COMMUNIS (Apr. 28, 2008),
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2008/04/28/interview-mike-gold-corporate-counsel-bigelow-aerospace.
106 See sources cited supra note 105.
107 Gold, supra note 32, at 172-73.
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to be modified for use with controlled space technology and
was, therefore, itself subject to ITAR controls.10
Prior to the DDTC's ruling that excepted Bigelow from certain aspects of ITAR, Bigelow Aerospace feared that it would
have been required to acquire a license from the DDTC before
allowing any foreign national to set foot on one of its space stations."o' For example, if Bigelow placed into orbit a space station that was to be visited by foreign nationals, ITAR would have
required that Bigelow obtain a license (by submitting a DSP-5
form) for each foreign national that was anticipated to inhabit
the space station.o This requirement would also apply to any
third party that might purchase a Bigelow space station. That is,
if Bigelow placed a space station into orbit and then transferred
the station to a U.S. purchaser, the purchaser would have to obtain a license prior to permitting a foreign national to enter the
space station. In addition to the costs of seeking such a license,
there would also have been a risk that the DDTC would deny a
license, thus preventing the foreign national from entering the
space station at all.
In addition, Bigelow would have been required to enter into a
Technical Assistance Agreement with each foreign passenger,
which would then have to be submitted to the DDTC for its approval."' Bigelow was also concerned that the more burdensome requirements regarding the creation of a Technology
Transfer Controls Plan and DTSA monitoring of all conversations with foreign passengers would be triggered if the space stations were launched from non-NATO countries.' 12 If these
provisions of ITAR would have been applied strictly to Bigelow's
operations, it may have jeopardized the success of the company
since it would have made it far more difficult to attract and
maintain foreign customers. The pool of potential customers
for Bigelow's space stations is small to begin with and a significant portion of that pool is composed of foreign companies and
space agencies. Therefore, the possibility that ITAR would interfere with Bigelow's ability to fully tap into the foreign market
was a threat to the company's viability.
One way that a company can escape the burdens of ITAR
compliance is to ask the DDTC to remove the company's tech108 Id.
oo See

Klamper, infra note 117.

110 See Gold, supra note 32, at 176.

111 See id. at 177-79.
112

See supra Part II.D.
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nology from the USML by way of a "commodity jurisdiction request" (CJ request)."' When submitting a CJ request, the
applicant is requesting that the DDTC remove the applicant's
technology from the USML, thus transferring the technology to
the jurisdiction of the DOC, which oversees exports of dual-use

items under the EAR.1 1 4
On December 27, 2007, Bigelow Aerospace submitted a CJ request to the DDTC seeking to remove its expandable space platform technology from the USML." 5 Although the DDTC
typically makes a determination within three or four months after receiving a request, a decision was not to be issued in this
case for sixteen months." The suspense was broken on April
22, 2009, when Bigelow Aerospace announced that the DDTC
had responded favorably to its CJ request.1 1 7 The DDTC had
ruled that the presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow space
station, as well as the training of these private astronauts, referred to collectively by Mr. Gold as the "passenger experience,"
was "non-licensable" under ITAR, meaning that the obligations
imposed by ITAR would not apply to this aspect of Bigelow's
operations."' Michael Gold had succeeded in his argument
that just because a person has seen a space station does not
mean that he or she can build one.
This ruling was rather unusual in that the DDTC will typically
decide either to remove the technology at issue from the USML
(thus transferring jurisdiction to the DOC) or to keep the technology on the USML (and continue to require licenses for ex22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2010).
See Introduction to Commerce Department Export Controls, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/exportingbasics.htm
(last visited July 17, 2010). Section 120.4 explains that a commodity jurisdiction
request can be used either "if doubt exists as to whether an article or service is
covered by the U.S. Munitions List" or "for consideration of a redesignation of an
article or service currently covered by the U.S. Munitions List." 22 C.F.R. § 120.4.
115 Bigelow Petitions State for ExportJurisdictionChange, SPACE NEWS, Mar. 3, 2008;
Space Technology: Earthbound. Export Control in the Space Business Has Gone Overboard, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2008; Gold, supra note 32, at 171 n.21.
116 In the course of this decision process, Michael Gold remained philosophical during what was unquestionably a suspenseful time for him and Bigelow Aerospace. When asked about the long wait, he showed no impatience, but instead
insisted that he was more interested in a good decision rather than a speedy one.
117 Bigelow Aerospace has not released to the public either its commodityjurisdiction request or the DDTC's response. See Amy Klamper, Mike Gold, Corporate
Counsel and Director of Washington Operations, Bigelow Aerospace, SPACE NEWS (Aug.
31, 2009), http://www.spacenews.com/profiles/091009profile-mike-gold.html.
113
114

118 Id.
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port)."' In Bigelow's case, the technology remained on the
USML, but the requirements for a license, Technical Assistance
Agreement, Technology Transfer Control Plan, and monitoring
will no longer apply with respect to the "passenger experience.""o Despite the fact that it was not expressly stated in the
ruling, the DDTC was apparently exercising the discretion
granted to it under section 126.3 to grant an exception from the
application of ITAR when it made this ruling.
Although it may appear that Bigelow Aerospace fell short by
not succeeding in having its technology removed from the
USML, this ruling appears to have been the best result for Bigelow since a transfer of its technology to the DOC would have
likely meant that a license would have to have been sought
under the Export Administration Regulations. However, under
the "non-licensable" ruling, Bigelow does not have to apply for
licenses from either the DDTC or the DOC. Prior to this DDTC
decision, the presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow space
station would have triggered the various burdens under ITAR.
The continuation of this policy would have placed an extraordinary burden on Bigelow due to the expensive and time-consuming process of complying with these requirements for each
foreign national present on a Bigelow space station. Bigelow
Aerospace's successful CJ request has removed these obstacles
and, as a result, has promised to breathe new life into the private spaceflight industry.
It is worth noting that the DDTC ruling is not without its limits. First, the ruling only applies to Bigelow Aerospace. Therefore, unless the ruling is replicated for other spaceflight
companies, it will, in reality, have no effect on the space industry
because, as explained below, there is no value in an exception
for people on a space station if the spaceflight companies that
have to deliver the people to the space station are subject to the
debilitating burdens of ITAR. Second, prospective passengers
who are nationals of the so-called "[s]ection 126.1 countries"
would still need a license from the appropriate agency before
being able to enter a Bigelow space station.121 Section 126.1 of
ITAR states that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to deny
licenses and other approvals for exports and imports of defense
articles and defense services, destined for or originating in cer119 See supra Part II.B.
120
121

See Klamper, supra note 117.
22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2009).
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countries . . . [including] Belarus, Cuba, Eriteria, Iran,

tam

North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela" as well as to "countries with
respect to which the United States maintains an arms embargo
(e.g., Burma, China, Liberia, and Sudan)." 2 2
Despite these limitations, the DDTC's ruling on Bigelow's CJ
request was heralded by other spaceflight companies as a major
breakthrough that promises to significantly ease the regulatory
burden on their operations. 1 23 For example, Marc Holzapfel,
counsel to Virgin Galactic, called the ruling a "major development" that will enable space companies to avoid the "complicated, expensive, and dilatory export approval process. "124
Likewise, the chief counsel of SpaceX, Tim Hughes, praised the
DDTC for adopting "a common-sense approach to ITAR."125
However, since the Bigelow ruling only provides relief to Bigelow Aerospace and does not apply to either Virgin Galactic or
other space tourism companies, these companies will have to
seek similar relief on their own.
IV.

EXTENDING THE BIGELOW RULING TO SPACE
TOURISM COMPANIES

Since Bigelow Aerospace announced the receipt of its
favorable ruling, there have been reports that Virgin Galactic
has already filed a CJ request that will rely on the Bigelow ruling
as precedent. 1 26 Other space tourism companies will likely follow suit. The typical method of requesting a section 126.3 exception is through the submission of a General Correspondence
letter to the DDTC. That Virgin Galactic has submitted a CJ
request indicates that the company is attempting to have its
spaceplane technology removed from the USML or else receive
a ruling that the term "spacecraft" in Category XV of the USML
does not include commercial spaceplanes (just as commercial
aircraft are not covered by ITAR) .127 The criteria considered by
the DDTC when determining whether to remove a particular
Id.
Natasha Loder, Breaking News on US Export Control, OVERMATTER (April 22,
2009), http://natashaloder.blogspot.com/2009/04/breaking-news-on-us-exportcontrol.html.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, Meeting Minutes
(May 21, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquarters offices/
ast/advisory-committee/meeting-news/archive/media/May%2021%202009.
pdf.
127 See supra Part II.B.
122
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technology from the USML are the same criteria that are taken
into account when determining under section 120.3 whether a
particular technology should be designated as a "defense article," namely, whether the technology: (1) is designed for military use, does not have a primary civilian application, and
exceeds the performance standards of equivalent civilian equipment; or (2) is designed for military use and has "significant"
military value.1 28 These criteria receive further elaboration in
section 120.4, but the primary criteria remain the same.12 9
Looking at the plain language of ITAR, suborbital spaceplane
technology of the type being developed by space tourism companies should be removed from the USML since it has not been
designed for military use and does not exceed the performance
of equivalent civilian space tourism equipment.13 0 That said, the
DDTC is likely to consider the potential military application of
the spaceplane technology when making its determination.
With respect to this issue, the DDTC should take into account
the fact that the spaceplanes that are currently under development are not in the same class of launch equipment that lofts
satellites into orbit and can easily double as ballistic missiles. Although there may be some concern that these spaceplanes
could deliver weapons of mass destruction to a target, the current state of spaceplane technology should eliminate any such
concerns since the suborbital vehicles are not capable of pointto-point flight to any significant degree, but only return to their
point of departure."3 ' In light of this, it appears that the test for
removing spaceplanes from the USML has been met, and the
See supra Part II.B.
22 C.F.R. § 120.4.
I3 See id.
131 It should be obvious that the space tourism equipment should not be characterized as any of the controlled items under the MTCR, whether as a rocket, a
"space launch vehicle," or a "reentry vehicle," simply because spaceplanes are not
missiles and such technology was not contemplated by this control regime. See
Peter van Fenema, Export Controls and Satellite Launches: What's New?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 239, 241
(2004) (citing the MTCR guidelines which make clear that the purpose of the
MTCR is to prevent the transfer of technology that can deliver weapons of mass
destruction and that the MTCR is "not designed to impede national space programs"); see also Waldrop, supra note 16, at 176, 190 (explaining that the "greatest
concern ... is that space launch vehicles essentially are ballistic missiles"). Likewise, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
(ICOC) is concerned with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and
should be not applied to the launch of commercial spaceplanes. For a discussion
of the nature and scope of the ICOC, see van Fenema, supra at 241-45.
128
129
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DDTC would be able to make such a ruling in response to a CJ
request from Virgin Galactic and the other space tourism
companies.
On the other hand, perhaps Virgin Galactic is simply following Bigelow Aerospace's example by submitting a CJ request
while still expecting nothing more than a section 126.3 exception of the "passenger experience." And whether this narrower
request to render the "passenger experience" excepted from
ITAR-as was done for Bigelow Aerospace-is made either in
the form of a CJ request or a General Correspondence letter,
the DDTC should grant the request for two reasons. First, the
refusal to grant such an exception to the space tourism companies would render the Bigelow ruling a nullity. Second, the circumstances for granting an exception under section 126.3 of
ITAR are clearly met in the case of space tounsm companies in
light of (i) the exceptional hardship that would be caused by the
strict application of ITAR and (ii) the strong interest that the
United States has in supporting the success of the private
human spaceflight industry.1 2
The first point is a rather obvious one, namely, that the
DDTC's previous ruling regarding Bigelow's operations would
be meaningless unless similar relief is granted to the companies
that will deliver people to the Bigelow space stations. The companies that Bigelow will rely on to deliver scientists, manufacturers, and recreational visitors to its space stations are likely to be
the same companies that are now offering suborbital tourism
services. These companies will continue to refine their technology until they are able to provide orbital delivery. However,
without relief from ITAR, the tourism companies may not be
able to survive even for the short term, let alone long enough to
develop orbital delivery capabilities. And without such services
being available, Bigelow Aerospace's space station venture will
collapse as there is no sense in placing a space station in orbit if
its stands empty.
In addition to this first point, the DDTC should except the
"passenger experience" of the space tourism companies from
ITAR under section 126.3 because the grounds for granting
such an exception are clearly met. As explained above, the
DDTC has the power to grant an exception from the application
of ITAR in the event of "exceptional or undue hardship, or
132

See 22 C.F.R. § 126.3.
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when it is otherwise in the interest of the United States."1 33 Although it is only necessary to show either exceptional hardship
or that the exception is in the interest of the United States, both
prerequisites are easily met in this case. First, it is undeniable
that the space tourism companies face exceptional hardship
under the ITAR regulations. In fact, the space tourism companies face even greater hardship than the hardship faced by Bigelow Aerospace. This is true because space tourism companies
will have a much higher number of passengers per year than
Bigelow would have on its space stations and will therefore have
to apply for many more export licenses to allow for the disclosures to the passengers that are mandated under the Human
Space Flight Regulations, as well as for allowing the passengers
on board (and thereby potentially disclosing "technical data" related to the spacecraft by means of visual inspection). For example, Virgin Galactic plans on eventually launching multiple
flights per day with six passengers per flight, which could eventually amount to thousands of passengers every year."34 In addition, the disclosure of technical data will also require space
tounsm companies to enter into a Technical Assistance Agreement with each individual passenger-an agreement which
must then be submitted to the DDTC for approval prior to the
disclosure of any such data.'13 The cost and complexity of acquiring licenses and entering into Technical Assistance Agreements for each passenger would be colossal and would
unquestionably harm a company's ability to attract foreign customers who would likely prefer to fly with a foreign space tourism company that is not subject to the cost, uncertainty, and
delay of the U.S. regulatory regime.
The success of the space tourism industry would also be
threatened by the special controls under section 124.15, which
are triggered by the provision of defense services related to a
launch from a non-allied territory. As described above, these
special controls require Technology Transfer Control Plans as
well as permit the DTSA to monitor all discussions and activities
related to the launch (with the expense of such monitoring being borne by the company).xs3

While Bigelow was concerned

that section 124.15 would be triggered by the presence of their
See supra Part II.E.
See, e.g., Leonard David, Virgin Galactic Details Its Space Travel Plans,
MSNBC.com (Nov. 11, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15654772/.
135 See supra Part II.C.
136 22 C.F.R. § 124.15.
13s
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customers on their space stations, there is a good argument that
this provision would not have been triggered since Bigelow will
not be involved with the launch of these customers.1 3 7 Passengers will be delivered to the space stations by other companies.138 And if Bigelow is not involved in the launching of its
customers, then the customers' presence on the space station
would not be subject to section 124.15.131 Of course, Bigelow
would still be subject to section 124.15 when launching its space
stations from non-allied territory,140 but that is a less contentious
issue since, although burdensome, such launches would take
place relatively infrequently (compared with the frequency of
space tourism flights).
In contrast, it seems far more likely that the activities of space
tourism companies will trigger the application of the special
controls under section 124.15 when the flights are launched
from non-allied territories since customers of space tourism
companies will actually be involved on a first-hand basis in the
launching of the spacecraft.' 4 ' Therefore, not only do these
companies run the risk that they may be found to be providing
defense services by disclosing to their passengers (through visual
inspection and safety training) technical data relating to their
spacecraft, but this defense service may be deemed to be provided in connection with the launch of the spacecraft, thus triggering the controls of section 124.15.
Admittedly, the special controls of section 124.15 only apply if
the tourism companies launch from non-allied territories. It
may seem that space tourism companies may easily avoid
launching from non-allied territories and thus avoid the burdens of section 124.15.142 After all, the list of NATO countries
and major non-NATO allies is a long one, including at this point
forty-three countries.14 However, there are significant omissions from this list. For example, Sweden is neither a member
137

See supra Part III.

-n See supra Part III.
139 At

the most, the presence of the customers on a Bigelow space station
would be treated as an export of the space station (through visual disclosure) or
the provision of a defense service, which would only require an export license
and Technical Assistance Agreement. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying
text.
140 See supra Part II.D.
141 See supra Part II.D.
142 See supra Part II.D.
143 Mmber Countries, supra note 92.
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of NATO nor a major non-NATO ally.' 4 4 This is significant because Spaceport Sweden is one of the spaceports that plans to
provide services to the space tourism companies.1 4 5 Some foreign space tourism companies are also pursuing the possibility
of launching flights from a spaceport in Abu Dhabi or Dubai.146
Once again, U.S.-based space tourism companies will have a
hard time following foreign competitors to these launch sites
due to the fact that neither Sweden nor the United Arab Emirates are on the list of allied countries. These launch sites are
attractive due to their ability to serve the customer pools of Europe and the Middle East-where a large number of potential
customers with sufficient funds for this type of adventure tourism are to be found. Unfortunately, U.S.-based companies may
be locked out of this market unless they are relieved of the burdens of section 124.15.
To make one final point regarding section 124.15, the DDTC
could also choose to interpret the section as applying only to
"defense services" related to the launch of satellites (and not the
launch of a spaceplane), since the opening of the section mentions the export of satellites in particular-in which case the entire specter of section 124.15 would evaporate.1 4 7 In the event
that this narrow reading of the section is not adopted, the
DDTC should at least grant an exception under section 126.3
with respect to disclosures made to space tourists.
In addition to the grounds of exceptional hardship that space
tourism companies would suffer under ITAR, a "passenger experience" exception from ITAR should be granted solely on the
grounds that such an exception would be in the interest of the
United States. The interest that would be served is two-fold.
First, the space tourism industry is a significant development in
the commercialization of space, and the technological developments that result from these early tourism ventures are likely to
lead to more substantial commercial ventures, such as orbital
manufacturing, orbital research laboratories, point-to-point
space travel, and even the mining of the moon or other celestial

bodies. The United States has a great interest from an eco144
145
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Virgin Galactic Appoints First Space Travel Agents in Scandinavia, SPACEPORT

(Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.ssc.se/?id=9504&cid=14435.
Loveday Morris, Space Tourism Set for Gulf Blast-Off THE NATIONAL (May 3,
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nomic perspective in being at the forefront of this industry and
should therefore modulate the application of ITAR in a manner
that will foster the competitiveness of U.S. companies.
In addition to the economic interests at stake, the United
States has a strong interest in ensuring the success of U.S.
human spaceflight companies from the standpoint of national
security. A strong space presence has for a long time been an
important component of American strength and national security. 14 8 And now that the Obama Administration plans to eliminate NASA's spaceflight program and rely instead on the private
space industry to meet the government's spacefaring needs, it
has become essential for the government to make every effort to
facilitate the success of the private spaceflight industry-which
at this point means supporting the space tourism industry. This
does not mean that certain export controls cannot be kept in
place when required to prevent the proliferation of dangerous
technologies, but it does mean that the DDTC should grant exceptions wherever possible in order to ease the regulatory burden on these young companies.
The DDTC should also be confident that granting a "passenger experience" exception to the space tourism companies
would not result in the proliferation of the dangerous technologies that ITAR is designed to prevent. As discussed above, the
spaceplanes that are currently under development are designed
for purely commercial purposes and do not have the potential
of delivering weapons to a target." 9 Moreover, the tourism
equipment is not designed for military use and therefore does
not come within the criteria for ITAR control set forth in section 120.3.150 And not only is technology not of a type that
should raise national security concerns, but the transmission of
the "technical data" to space tourists is also of a nature that fails
to warrant the application of export controls. Even if the
Human Space Flight Regulations are interpreted broadly to require disclosure about every aspect of spacecraft safety and potential risks, it is highly unlikely that the information divulged to
passengers (or the equipment that is visible to passengers) will
entail the level of technological detail that is relevant to the construction and flight operation of the spaceplanes (unless a pas148 For a discussion of the history of the United States' reliance on the commercial space industry for national security needs, see Waldrop, supra note 16, at
158, 199.
149 See supra Part IV.

150 See supra Part II.B.
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senger happens to inquire about engine mechanics or other
highly technical matters).
For the reasons set forth above, the U.S. government has little
to fear and much to gain from easing the regulatory burdens on
the space tourism industry by excepting the "passenger experience" from ITAR. The discretion that the DDTC has been
granted in section 126.3 allows the agency to adjust the application of ITAR in an appropriate manner to achieve the policy
goals of maintaining security while also protecting the interest
of the Unites States in supporting this new industry of private
human spaceflight. The relaxation of ITAR in order to support
the innovative and important ventures undertaken by the new
space tourism industry is precisely the situation that section
126.3 was intended to address. And as discussed in the following section, if the DDTC does not provide relief to the space
tourism industry, then it is likely that no relief will be provided,
since Congress does not seem capable of reforming the law
given the political paralysis that has gripped our nation's capital.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE FUTURE OF
EXPORT CONTROL REFORM
The stated commitment of the Obama Administration to export control reform provides hope that the unnecessary regulatory burdens described in this article will be lifted from the
shoulders of commercial human spaceflight companies, thus allowing them to thrive in the global marketplace. The recent
bills that passed the House in 2008 and 2009 also show that support for reform exists in Congress."' However, when these reforms will take place and what the nature of these reforms will
be is uncertain. The mere removal of commercial satellites
from the USML will not benefit tourism. These reforms, if they
occur at all, may not be implemented for years. In the
meantime, space tourism companies are on the verge of beginning their operations, and therefore regulatory relief must be
granted to these companies through the exercise of the DDTC's
administrative discretion to grant exceptions from ITAR or to
remove spaceplane technology from the USML entirely.
The DDTC's actions connected with the Bigelow ruling and
the potential for the DDTC to grant relief to the space tourism
companies provide a striking example of an interesting phenomenon in the field of administrative law. One of the more
151 See
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debated issues in the field of administrative law is the matter of
administrative discretion and, in particular, the benefits and
dangers of providing administrative agencies with discretion to
tailor the application of law to individual cases.1 - 2 By easing the
regulatory burdens on Bigelow Aerospace, the DDTC has illustrated the benefit of administrative discretion in two distinct
ways. First, the DDTC has shown how administrative discretion
can be used to adjust the application of a statute to new technologies and fact scenarios that were not contemplated during the
drafting of the statute. Second, the DDTC has shown how an
administrative agency, through its discretionary powers, can act
in place of the constitutionally established organs of government when these organs are unable to take action themselves
due to political paralysis.
The idea that administrative discretion is useful, and even
necessary, in order to adjust the application of law to unforeseeable circumstances has been widely recognized.' 3 Kenneth
Culp Davis identifies this primary purpose of administrative
agencies in his seminal 1969 book, Discretionaryjustice, when he
explains that one of the main reasons for the tremendous increase in administrative discretion in the United States during
the nineteenth century was that the legislature was unable to
craft a set of rules in advance to cover unforeseeable future circumstances or new developments that were sure to arise during
a time when society, technology, and business were evolving at a
rapid pace.15 4 As Davis points out, the mechanical application
of an inflexible rule (such as the blanket rule subjecting all
space technology to ITAR) will certainly lead to unjust or undesirable results. 5 5 Discretion is needed in order to tailor the general rule to the unique circumstances of a particular case in
order to produce a result that properly balances the relevant
interests and policies.'55 This careful balancing of various policies in light of the specific facts of a case is best carried out on a
case-by-case basis at the administrative level-which was the raSee, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp
Davis, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 315, 331-37 (2005).
153 Id.
154 Kenneth Culp Davis, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 15-17,
20, 24 (1969). See, in particular, Davis's statement that "[i]nventing rules to answer all regulatory questions is far beyond the intellectual capacity of the ablest
men." Id. at 42.
155 Id. at 19.
156 Id.
152
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tionale behind the inclusion of section 126.3 in ITAR, giving the
DDTC discretion to grant an exception from the application of
the regulations in the event of "exceptional or undue hardship,
or when it is otherwise in the interest of the United States."15 7
The Bigelow CJ request was the perfect scenario for the application of the DDTC's discretion to grant an exception from the
regulations. The DDTC was faced with a request to determine
whether Bigelow space stations were subject to ITAR. Unable to
rule that the space stations were not satellites (since they orbit
the Earth), the DDTC could only respond by ruling that ITAR
would apply to the export of the space stations.1 58 However, it is
to the credit of the DDTC that it recognized that the imposition
of the regulations would threaten the viability of this new industry. Bigelow Aerospace was not a communications satellite manufacture or a provider of launch services-it was instead a new
type of business that provided for the private habitation of
space. And if ITAR were strictly applied to Bigelow's operations,
the burden could crush the new company. This was the perfect
opportunity for the DDTC to use the discretion that had been
granted to it in section 126.3 to issue an exception since there
was every indication that the strict application of the regulations
would result in "exceptional or undue hardship."1 5 9 Moreover,
it was also in the interest of the United States to ease the regulations and allow this groundbreaking company to grow in a reasonable regulatory environment since the company's success will
contribute greatly to the evolution of a vibrant new private space
industry.
The other benefit of the administrative discretion wielded by
the DDTC under section 126.3 is of a type that has not been
widely recognized in scholarly literature-at least not in the particular form illustrated by the Bigelow ruling. This benefit is
found in the ability of the DDTC to grant an exception to commercial space companies from the burdens of ITAR when the
legislative branch is so paralyzed by the politics of the day that it
is unable to modify the law to remove commercial satellites from
the scope of ITAR, as has been demanded by industry and
academia for years.1 60 In other words, the DDTC has shown how
administrative discretion allows for the law to be modified in its
157 22 C.F.R. § 126.3 (2009).
158 See supra Part III.
159 22 C.F.R. § 126.3.
160 See supra note
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application by the administrative agency when the legislature is
unable to make necessary amendments to the law due to the
paralyzing effects of political pressures.
The current highly factionalized political environment has
made it virtually impossible for any meaningful legislative reforms to pass both houses-and the reform of arms trafficking
regulations poses special challenges.'
Any politician who recommends relaxing ITAR (even if they are really only talking
about the exemption of purely commercial technology) opens
himself to political attacks for being soft on national defense.1 6 2
In this political climate, the legislature is paralyzed. And without the legislature being able to enact the necessary ITAR reforms, the only hope lies with the DDTC, which has the
discretion to grant an exception from the regulations when necessary. The use of administrative discretion to solve the problem of political paralysis in the age of terror, party factionalism,
and divided government strikes a chord that is similar to the
"public choice" theory in administrative law, which, as enunciated in Pierce's treatise on administrative law, states that politicians prefer to allow administrative agencies to make
controversial policy decisions rather than make a decision that
may alienate a segment of voters and thus place the politicians'
political career in jeopardy.'
Although the reality of political
paralysis is an unfortunate development that signals a profound
flaw in our democracy, it has illustrated how, when the traditional constitutional organs of government are paralyzed by
politics or are otherwise dysfunctional, administrative agencies
can step in and shape the law in a reasonable manner pursuant
to their discretionary powers.

161 For a first-hand account of the current paralysis of Congress, see
Evan Bayh,
Why I'm Leaving the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, at WK9; see also RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 134-35 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining how
party factionalism has led to gridlock because different parties control the Presidency and Congress-and each has the power to thwart the other branch); Peter
Beinart, Why Washington Is Tied Up in Knots, TIME, Mar. 1, 2010, at 20.
162 See Spector, supra note 9, at 14 (explaining that at the time of his writing
the article there was a "strong group within Congress that ... is largely suspicious
of any efforts that might appear to make satellite exports easier" and that "[i]t
seems unlikely that meaningful reforms will be enacted .. . when U.S. representatives are not likely to embrace any bill that exposes them to a charge of being
'soft' on national security").
163 PIERCE, supra note 161, at 99; see alsoJerry Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
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This reliance on the authority and discretion of the DDTC to
grant an exception from the ITAR regulations in order to allow
for the successful operation of the new human spaceflight industry may, given the current political climate, be a more realistic
alternative to the revision of the regulations. By giving the
DDTC officers an opportunity to tailor the application of the
existing regulations in a reasonable manner, the burden of
ITAR on commercial space enterprises could be reduced significantly. However, since an exception under section 126.3 only
affects the operations of the requesting company, broad relief
across the industry would require each of the space companies
to file their own request. This task could be made easier if companies would share their CJ requests in order to enable others to
submit similar requests. This would obviously require the sharing of valuable information with competitors-but would be
done in order to achieve the greater goal of improving the competitiveness and viability of the spaceflight industry as a whole.
If the DDTC granted a series of exceptions from the application
of ITAR with respect to the "passenger experience," it would
pave the way for a formal revision of the USML to remove the
burdens of ITAR from this aspect of the spaceflight company
operations. For once the section 126.3 exceptions are granted
and the spaceflight industry proves itself to be an important and
viable industry, the suggestion to formalize the exception in a
revision of the regulations should entail less political
controversy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States is entering a new age of space commercialization that will be fueled by the Obama administration's new
reliance on services provided by private companies. Now more
than ever the strength of the U.S. space program will depend on
a robust domestic industry that is able not merely to service the
needs of the government, but actually replace the government
spaceflight program. The policy is daring and forward-thinking,
but it also comes with risks. An entrepreneur in the space industry will have to surmount the impossible by succeeding in an
exotic venture that is capital intensive, technologically challenging, and-if that were not enough-burdened by a byzantine
regulatory system that promises substantial attorneys' fees and, if
violations occur, crushing penalties. Fortunately, these regulatory hurdles can be largely removed by easing the impact of the
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ITAR regulations in a manner that properly balances commercial needs with security concerns.
Although the current political environment-characterized
by factionalism, a split government, and, in the end, governmental paralysis-has made it impossible for Congress to respond to
the clear need to reform ITAR, the DDTC has used its discretion
wisely to except Bigelow Aerospace from the those aspects of
ITAR that threatened the survival of the company. This use of
administrative discretion to modify the application of law when
the constitutional organs of government are unable to act is a
powerful example of the importance of administrative agencies
to our democracy-when government breaks down, the agencies can take over the work of government. This article has
made the case for why the DDTC should continue to exercise its
discretion by granting similar exceptions for the "passenger experience" to the space tourism companies that will soon begin
to fly customers into space. The need for such an exception is
even stronger for such companies than was the case for Bigelow
Aerospace since their number of customers will be significantly
larger than those of Bigelow and the nature of their operations
will be more likely to trigger ITAR controls. The interests of the
United States demand that these exceptions be granted. A successful domestic commercial spaceflight industry will not only
bring jobs, prosperity, and technological advantages to the
United States, but will also ensure the strength of our government space program, which, under the Obama Administration's
new space policy, will rely more than ever on private industry.
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